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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
DELFIN E. ORTEGA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 9709

PERRY A. THOMAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPELLANT'S RE'PL Y BRIEF
ARGUMENT
APPELLANT DID NOT WAIVE HIS ASSIGNMENT
OF ERROR TO THE COURT'S VERDICT-DIRECTING
INSTRUCTION NO. 12.

Respondent in his Point III (Respondent's
Brief, p. 3), alleges that the defendant and appellant took no exception to a ''explanatory instruction" and thereby "irrevocably put aside his claim
of error by stipulating that it be given." Since the
premise upon which the respondent bases this allegation is not supported by the record, a review of
pertinent facts is necessary.
The jury had deliberated more than seven hours
1
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when they sought assistance from the court concerning the meaning of Instructions No. 12 and 14.
(First Additional Record, filed November 6, 1962.)
Thererafter, the court gave the following instruction upon stipulation of counsel.
"The instructions you ask about do set
out the law applicable to the opposite theories
of each case of each party. You should follow
the instruction which you think is supported
by a preponderance of the evidence."
(First Additional Record, page 2.)
At the hearing on the motion for a new trial,
plaintiff's attorney contended that the defendant
had waived his right to object to the "explanatory
instruction". The following comments by the court
are taken from the record :
"THE COURT: The Court knows that
both counsel were acting in good faith. Both
counsel actually wanted to win their lawsuits,
but at the same time they wanted to present
error-free instructions and see that error-free
procedure was followed at all tin1e'S. Of course,
in looking back now, by hindsight, of course,
there may have been things we all would have
decided differently at that time. But I think
th!at both parties, for that matter, took adequate exception, and I felt all the exceptions
that were taken by Mr. Hanson, certainly
preserved his right to argue this point and
to appeal them, because I think the exceptions
as he has. argued them here this morning,
and the points of law were certainly properly
excepted to at the trial, and they are properly before the court. \There is no question about
2
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that. The Court doesn't think he waived anything by helping to draft or consenting that
the last clarifying instruction was [sic] given
to the jury. I don't think that in any way
prejudiced Mr. Hanson's right to make his
motion, or his right to appeal."
(Transcript, Motion for New Trial, pp. 28
and 29.)
Counsel for the plaintiff persisted in urging
his theory of waiver upon the court. The record
then records the following:
"THE COURT: Of course, Mr. Hanson
has 'already objected to the instruction given.
"'MR. KING: But the fact apparently
was completely"THE COURT: I think the error, if any,
had been committed and I don't think anything we could have done at that time would
have helped."
(Transcript, Motion for New Trial, p. 31.)
The reasons the giving of Instruction No. 12
constituted error are set forth in Appellant's Brief,
Point I, page 4. It i's pertinent to observe however,
that when the "clarifying instruction" was given
the error had already occurred, and the jury had
been wrestling with it for seven hours. The time
to have corrected that error was before the instructions were read to the jury, when a proper exception had been taken, rather than attempt clarification after the jury was plunged into the conflict
3
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which existed between Instruction No. 12 and No.
14. These two instructions were irreconcilable. To
accept one was to reject the other. The fact that
the jury could not reconcile them bespeaks the
thoroughness with which they undertook their charge
and affirms the validity of the objection which hrad
been made to those instructions by defendant. The
"clarifying" instruction did not clarify, it merely
informed the jury to consider the case on the basis
it had been submitted to them. 'The error remained
and their dilemma continued.
It was incumbent upon the court to properly
state the law. The defendant should not be pen alized for hi's attempt to assist the court in eliminating an error which had been made, and proper exception reserved.
1

'The right to alter the instructions, or to give
additional instruction was, of course, within the
sound discretion of the trial judge. The court realized th!at after the jury had been considering the
conflict between these instructions for such a period
of time that any attempt to correct them by patchwork would draw undue attention to the revised
instruction and create further prejudice. Under the
circumrstances the court probably did all it could
do to avoid additional error.
The court in seeking ·counsel's assistance in preparing a clarifying instruction understood and stat4
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ed that neither of the parties "waived anything",
and that the defendant's right to take an appeal
on the originally assigned error was preserved.
(Transcript, Motion for New Trial, p. 29.)
The clear implication of plaintiff's argument
is that the presence of opposing counsel 'at a time
when the plaintiff was urging error upon the court,
not only condoned the error but waived any right
to object to it. The record is plain that a proper
objection was taken to Instruction No. 12 and was
continued at every point in the proceedings.
It is, of course, the responsibility of the pl'aintiff as well as defendant to assist the court in giving proper instructions and to refrain from committing error. However, plaintiff suggests that because defendant was not successful in persuading
the court to avoid error, against his own arguments
to the contrary, defendant cannot now complain,
but has in effect, waived his right to appeal. Surely,
defendant's counsel cannot be expected to be more
diligent in plaintiff's cause than is his own counsel.
Plaintiff presented the misleading in'struetion and
urged the court to ~adopt it, which was done, against
the specific objection of the defendant.
The plaintif contends that the defendant ''irrevocably" put aside his claim of error by stipulating
that the explanatory instruction be given. Plaintiff
then cites several cases which he as~serts affirm
5
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that proposition. None of the cases are helpful. In
McCall v. McKendrick, 2 Utah 2d 364, 374 P.2d
962, the complaining party failed to take any objection whatsoever to the instructions given. He
requeste~ permission to state an objection on appeal ~ and was denied. Similarly, in Devine
v. Cook, 3 Utah 2d 134, 27 4 P.2d 1073, the objections taken were not explicit; nevertheless, the
court found that they were sufficient. In the case
of Ludlow v. Los Angeles-Salt Lake Railway, 73
Utah 513, 275 Pac. 593, the question was not even
discussed. Neither does State v. Kesler, 1'5 Uta:h 143,
49 Pac. 293, treat the problem. Although, 53 Am.
Jur. 'Tri al Sec. 513 contains a general discussion of
Instructions given after submission of a case to a
jury, it is not helpful here.
1

, No case is cited by the plaintiff which supports
the proposition that a defendant waives or puts
aside any claim of error by stipulating to a speci'al
instru'ction given to the jury at their request in the
face of a reservation of the objection to the prior
instruction.
ARGUMENT
1

DEFENDANT HAS NOT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO
APPEAL FROM: A RULING CONCERNING A DECLARATION OF THE COURT THAT A POLTCE OFFICE'R WAS AN EXPERT 'WITNESS.

The plain tiff and respondent in his brief ( p.
13), asserts that since the defendant did not argue on
6
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motion for new b·ial that certain remarks of the
court were prejudicial, such assertion cannot no·w
be urged on appeal. In support of this position the
plaintiff cites the case of Law v. Smith, 34 Utah
394, 408, 409, 410, 98 Pac. 300.
In that case an appeal was taken directly from
a judgment entered on a jury verdict. The basis of
the appeal was challenged because the claimed errors
had not been presented to the trial court on motion
for a new trial. The court, in discussing appellate
procedure stated:
'~The right to move for a new trial is
present in every case, whether legal or equitable, or whether tried to a court or jury. If
a party thinks he can convince the trial court
that it committed a judicial error and will
grant him a new trial without an appeal, he
may make his motion and obtain a ruling
upon it; but, when he has obtained one ruling
from the court and has taken or is given a
statutory exception, he need not require the
court to repeat the error before he is entitled
to a review of the error by this court . . . .
If the trial court has passed upon a matter
in the course of trial and an exception is taken
or is given by the statute, the ruling or decision made by the trial court, if assigned as
error, is before this court for review on appeal . . . any other holding would bring about
the incongruity of requiring the trial court to
pass twice on some matters, while it may do
so but once on others.

*

* *

"From what has been said it necessarily fol7
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lows that all orders, rulings and decisions
made by the trial court during the trial . ...
are before this court for review without a
motion for a new trial." (Emphasis added.)
It is only in those cases where a rna tter arises
following trial that it must be brought to the attention of the trial court by way of a motion for
a new trial, and the trial court given an opportunity
to pass upon the matter, before an appeal lies. 'The
case so holds.
The right to appeal as stated in Rule 72, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, contains no such limitations as suggested by respondent.
As plainly appears from the record, (T. 133136), and as cited at page 19 of Appellant's Brief,
the defendant properly objected to the comment
of the court, the matter was then discussed
in chambers and the objection was clearly reserved.
The trial court passed upon defendant's objection during the course of trial and the correctness of that ruling is properly before this court for
review.
CONCLUSION
Defendant and appellant did not waive any
right of appeal by stipulating to a ''clarifying instruction" given by the court after the case had
been submitted to the jury. Further, a ruling made
8
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by the Court during the course of trial is properly
before this court on appeal without submitting it
for review on Motion for a New Trial.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & BALDWIN and
MERLIN R. LYBBERT
515 Kearns Buiding
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant

9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

